Jorge Suárez, Deputy Head of the Emergency Service of the Valencian Community (Generalitat Valenciana), testified regarding the events during the devastating dana in October 2024. Speaking at a hearing in the Catarroja court, he explained that discussions at the Cecopi coordination center dragged on that day, leading to a delay in sending out the mass alert to the public.
According to Suárez, former department head Gabriela Pradas insisted that all decisions, including the text of the Es Alert emergency message, be made collectively. However, Suárez pointed out that Cecopi is merely an advisory body and cannot override the actionable leadership, which was carried out by Pradas herself.
He clarified that the dispute with Fire Consortium Chief José Miguel Basset and another specialist over the content of the alert was not particularly lengthy. Basset raised two concerns: the risk of causing panic among the public and the need to involve an expert. Suárez also noted that he learned about the first victim from Basset—not from Pradas, who only reported the tragedy to her chief of staff via message.
Alert delay
Suárez claims he suggested issuing a warning to residents even before the Cecopi meeting—around 5:15 p.m., when footage emerged of people on rooftops in Utiel and Requena. He repeated his proposal at 5:38 p.m., but did not receive support. According to him, it was clear by evening that the death toll was rising, and around 11:00 p.m. the mass casualty protocol was activated, despite statements to the contrary from regional leader Carlos Mazón.
According to Suárez, imposing a lockdown was not discussed in the draft messages. The guidance was simply for people to stay at home, which many interpreted as a call for self-isolation. Regarding information about the situation in the Barranco del Poyo area, Suárez noted that he does not recall any specific messages focused on that location—instead, the alerts covered a range of municipalities affected by incidents.
Responsibility and decisions
As the highest-ranking technical expert at the Emergency Coordination Center, Suárez returned to work after his vacation and accompanied Pradas throughout October 29, including at the Cecopi meeting. Both he and Baseta have been identified by politicians as key decision-makers during the critical moment.
Regarding the sending of the Es Alert at 20:11, when there were already numerous casualties, Suárez admitted that the discussions had dragged on. He also noted that the delay occurred because Pradas insisted on correcting the message in Valencian. The judge called the alert both late and erroneous, emphasizing that earlier notification could have saved lives. By the time it was sent, according to investigators, at least 155 people had died.
Timeline of events
During questioning, Suárez detailed how the events unfolded that day. By the afternoon, alarming reports were coming in from several municipalities, and rooftop footage from Utiel and Requena prompted the first proposals for a mass alert. However, decisions were made slowly, and it wasn’t until the evening that the protocol for handling mass casualties was activated.
The legal proceedings are ongoing, and Suárez’s testimony has become a key part of the investigation into the delay in issuing the emergency alert. Questions about who was responsible for the delays and why remain at the center of attention for both investigators and the public.
