The Provincial Court of Madrid has again acquitted Antonio Arroyo, often called the king of fast cash, after accusations that he granted high-interest loans to vulnerable families. Despite numerous complaints from borrowers who lost their homes, the court found that the contracts, signed before a notary and acknowledged by the borrowers, showed consent and did not constitute a criminal offense. The acquittal addresses criminal liability. It does not, by itself, determine whether the loans’ economic terms could be challenged separately in civil court.
The latest case brought together around thirty affected individuals who described similar experiences. Seeking urgent financial help, they were directed to Arroyo, who required them to sign loan agreements before a notary. Property ownership was the basic condition, allowing Arroyo to claim the home if debts went unpaid. Borrowers said they did not fully understand the terms, which included interest rates of 29% and six-month repayment periods, conditions many found impossible to meet. Some also alleged that they received less cash or fewer funds by check than the amounts stated in the contracts, but the court found this claim unproven.
During the trial, Arroyo’s defense noted that all complainants recognized their signatures and confirmed that a notary had explained the contract terms. The judge repeatedly stressed that there was no evidence of deception or trickery, a necessary element for criminal fraud. The notaries, cleared of any wrongdoing during the investigation, were a decisive factor in the verdict. The court maintained that a notarial document carried impressive legal weight in assessing the criminal allegations, even if some borrowers said they had limited understanding of financial terms. Separately, Spain’s Supreme Court has held that notarisation and a borrower’s signature do not, on their own, settle whether a loan’s terms may be usurious under civil law.
Testimonies in court showed how desperate many borrowers were. One was a mother of a disabled child who turned to Arroyo after her husband’s suicide; another was a nurse who borrowed €5,000 and ended up owing €63,000. A hairdresser was forced to sell her business to settle her debt. Arroyo was tried alongside eight associates, including three family members. Two employees admitted in court that they knowingly targeted vulnerable individuals, but all defendants were acquitted of fraud and criminal organization charges.
The court said that although Arroyo’s lending practices were severe, they did not meet the threshold for criminal prosecution. The judges suggested that disputes over the fairness of the contracts should instead be resolved in civil court. That distinction matters under Spain’s 1908 Law on the Repression of Usury: in Plenary Judgment 628/2015, the Supreme Court set out a test focused on whether interest is substantially above the normal rate for money. Later legal analysis explained that an excessive disparity can be sufficient without separately proving both elements cumulatively. The relevant comparison is generally the annual percentage rate (APR, known in Spain as the TAE), which reflects the overall cost of credit rather than the nominal interest rate alone. The doctrine also does not require a borrower to prove they signed while in a state of personal desperation.
A Supreme Court judgment dated 9 March 2026 illustrates how courts use market benchmarks. It found a 16.61% APR usurious in a personal-loan case, compared with the Bank of Spain’s 8.10% average for personal loans of one to five years in February 2019. The court found no exceptional circumstance to justify the difference. The ruling, covered in legal analysis by Diario Crítico, concerns a different loan and does not determine the merits of the claims against Arroyo. It shows how a civil court can assess the cost of credit against a relevant market comparator. The Madrid court also noted that private loans often carry harsher terms than those offered by traditional banks, especially when conventional financing is unavailable. It distinguished severe terms from the conduct required to establish a criminal case.
A separate 2026 ruling by the Provincial Court of Bizkaia offers another example of how civil courts may assess a loan’s combined economic effects. The court declared null a private mortgage loan made in April 2012, under which the borrower received €38,000 at a nominal rate of 15.95%, with a 6% opening fee and an estimated APR of 20.53%. For 59 months, she made interest-only payments of about €505.08 a month without reducing the principal. The court ordered the lender to pay €94,491.45 plus legal interest. The court considered the difference between the loan’s estimated APR and a 17.01% alternative-mortgage reference insufficient on its own, but assessed the fee, payment structure and property security together. Reporting by El Correo and Deia described the appellate court’s decision as a reversal of an earlier dismissal. This was a separate civil case, not a ruling about Arroyo or the Madrid defendants.
Arroyo, now 72, has faced multiple legal challenges over the years. Previous cases ended in acquittal because of expired statutes of limitations, withdrawn complaints or the deaths of claimants. Notaries have consistently been a decisive factor in his favor. The most recent trial, held in February at the Provincial Court of Madrid, was marked by tension, including incidents involving Arroyo’s relatives and media crews.
Madrid’s courts have recently been at the center of several high-profile property and finance disputes, including the controversial purchase of a luxury penthouse for government use, which sparked debate over public spending. For more on this topic, see the report on the Chamberí penthouse acquisition by Madrid’s regional government.
In Spain, civil courts handle disputes over potentially abusive lending terms separately from criminal prosecutions. Remedies may include contract invalidity and repayment consequences rather than criminal penalties. The Arroyo case highlights the distinction: the acquittal means the defendants were not found criminally liable in this trial, while the Supreme Court’s usury structure leaves assessment of a loan’s effective cost and market comparison to the relevant civil proceedings. The verdict can still be appealed to the Supreme Court.
