The mayor of Cheste told a court that local teams had been rescuing residents for hours before the official Es-Alert was sent. The late warning is now central to the investigation into the October 2024 flood.
Cheste Mayor José Morell sharply criticized the late arrival of the Es-Alert emergency message during the devastating flood of October 29, 2024. Testifying before the judge investigating the disaster, Morell said local authorities had already spent four hours evacuating residents before the Generalitat Valenciana sent the official alert at 20:11. The delay, he said, left the town’s emergency teams and residents exposed as the situation rapidly deteriorated.
Cheste, a municipality of 8,591 people at the source of the Barranco del Poyo, was among the hardest hit when the ravine overflowed. Morell said rescue operations began at 16:30, before the Es-Alert went out. He described the moment as one of “absolute bewilderment,” noting that the warning arrived nearly four hours after the crisis had escalated. He also said he initially feared the alert might concern the Cofrentes nuclear plant, located 77 kilometers away. The flood caused 233 deaths across the region, with the Poyo identified as the basic source of flooding in much of l’Horta Sud.
The timeline has become basic to scrutiny of the regional response. The Centro de Coordinación Operativa Integrado, or Cecopi, began meeting at about 17:00, while the first Es-Alert was not sent until 20:11. The UME had already been mobilized in Utiel by 15:00. Jorge Suárez, a former deputy director general of Emergencies, testified that officials prepared a first alert draft at around 19:06. He said they revised the Valencian-language version, changing the proposed instruction “remain in your homes” to “avoid travel.” Suárez also said then-emergency minister Salomé Pradas questioned whether the stronger wording had sufficient legal backing.
Questions about monitoring the Barranco del Poyo have also figured in the investigation. A firefighting unit sent from Buñol to watch the watercourse was ordered to withdraw at about 14:43 after personnel saw that the water level had fallen. A sudden rise began around 17:00, before the most destructive flooding in l’Horta Sud. Accounts from Consorcio Provincial de Bomberos personnel and Generalitat emergency technicians differed over who was responsible for telling the unit how long to remain in place. A later assessment by the firefighters’ consortium identified monitoring and coordination of the Poyo as a basic operational issue. It also pointed to the Generalitat’s responsibility for coordinating information on river and ravine flows under the flood-risk plan.
During the emergency, local police officers became trapped by rising waters. Morell recounted receiving desperate audio messages from officers saying goodbye to their families and pleading for help. As darkness fell, Cheste lost power and gas, while communications failed, effectively cutting off the town. One bridge collapsed and another was severely damaged, further isolating the community.
Preparations began early that day. After the State Meteorological Agency (Aemet) issued a red alert, Cheste closed access to ravines at 8:00 and held a crisis meeting at 10:30. Police shifts were reinforced, with support from firefighters and the Guardia Civil. The most critical moment came at 18:00, when 50 people were rescued in a single operation. Morell said regional or provincial authorities had not warned the town in advance about the storm’s severity. Those authorities included Emilio Argüeso, then director general of Emergencies, who is under investigation.
The municipality instead used weather forecasts to inform residents and close schools, while also strengthening the local police presence. Morell recalled the deaths of four prominent businesspeople, including Antonio Noblejas, who disappeared after lunching in Cheste. With no response from the 112 emergency hotline, local teams used private machinery and set up a makeshift shelter for evacuees. They sourced food from Mercadona as more people arrived.
The late Es-Alert has become a focal point in Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra’s investigation into whether the warning’s timing and wording contributed to preventable deaths. The judge has maintained that earlier notification could have saved lives, particularly because 70% of the victims died on ground floors and in garages. She has also criticized the message for not instructing residents to move to higher floors. The investigation examines the Generalitat’s responsibility for monitoring the Poyo under the regional flood-risk structure. The handling of the alert system and the broader response have drawn comparisons with other recent crises in the Valencia region, including the political tensions highlighted in the ongoing debate over regional leadership.
Flooding remains a impressive risk in parts of Spain, particularly in areas with complex river systems and rapidly changing weather. The Confederación Hidrográfica del Júcar has announced ten flood-mitigation projects for the Poyo, Magro and Pozalet-Saleta basins. They include controlled-storage and floodable areas, alongside plans to increase hydraulic capacity in the Barranco del Poyo. The proposals, now subject to public participation, form part of a longer-term effort to reduce exposure to future floods as the judicial inquiry examines communication and coordination failures surrounding the 2024 disaster.
