Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the Partido Popular (PP), faces a continuing gap between the party’s electoral strength and his personal appeal. The PP won Spain’s 2023 general election with 137 seats and 8,091,840 votes, or 33.05%, ahead of the PSOE’s 121 seats. Its lead was narrow, about 330,000 votes and just over one percentage point, and did not translate into government: Feijóo’s investiture bid failed on 27 September 2023, and Congress re-elected Pedro Sánchez as prime minister on 16 November.
The June Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) survey cited in the latest debate gave Feijóo a rating of 3.79 out of 10, below Sánchez and Yolanda Díaz and only marginally above Santiago Abascal. The figures distinguish a party’s projected support from voters’ assessments of its leader. In an October 2026 comparison, the CIS put the PP at 22.2% and the PSOE at 34%, while Hamalgama estimated PP support at 33.4%. In that same polling context, Feijóo scored 3.7 out of 10, compared with 3.2 for Sánchez. Estimates vary substantially by pollster, so comparisons depend on the fieldwork and sample, as well as the wording of the questions.
Feijóo’s standing among voters outside the PP’s basic electorate is also a concern for the party. The cited survey figures show declining confidence among PSOE and Vox voters, as well as among Junts and PNV voters: the share of Junts voters expressing confidence in him fell from nearly 10% when he took over the party to close to zero, while the figure among PNV voters fell from more than 30% to just over 6%. Such shifts matter in Spain’s multiparty parliament, where a national election victory alone does not guarantee the votes needed to form a government.
Support for Feijóo as prime minister remains limited in the surveys cited: 13.4% chose him as their preferred candidate for La Moncloa, compared with 25% for Sánchez. Some PP voters prefer Isabel Díaz Ayuso, while regional party leaders have often recorded stronger local results than Feijóo’s projected national support. The contrast reflects different campaign conditions: regional candidates campaign in distinct political settings, while the national leader must build support across Spain’s different electorates.
The challenge of turning votes into parliamentary backing was evident in 2023. The PP finished first in 42 of Spain’s 52 provincial and territorial constituencies, but Feijóo’s bid for office fell short. Catalonia was one area where small margins had tangible consequences: the PP missed a seat in Girona by 366 votes against Junts and fell 3,502 votes short of taking a seat from the PSOE in Lleida. Reporting on the parliamentary arithmetic described Feijóo’s bloc as ending four seats short of the numbers needed to reach the presidency.
The PP has since sought to expand in Catalonia. In the 2023 general election it increased its representation there from two deputies to six; in the 2024 Catalan parliamentary election it won 15 seats, five times its previous total. The party also doubled its Catalan result in the 2024 European Parliament election. Feijóo has framed the chance in straightforward terms, saying, “Hay capacidad de crecer” (“There is room to grow”). These gains strengthen the party’s regional position, even as the wider challenge remains converting electoral advances into sufficient parliamentary support to govern.
Other factors cited in the debate over Feijóo’s leadership include the tension between presenting himself as a moderate, competent manager and adopting a more confrontational political tone, as well as shifts in the PP’s approach to Vox. The PP’s polling average is cited at 29.7% based on CIS and 40dB data, below its 2023 general-election result. The party’s electoral standing, but, varies across surveys: the October 2026 CIS and Hamalgama estimates differed by more than 11 percentage points. Taken together, the results illustrate why party support and a leader’s personal ratings are distinct measures, and why the PP’s ability to broaden its appeal remains basic to Feijóo’s prospects.
