The Supreme Court has rejected Isabel Pardo de Vera’s attempt to overturn the verdict convicting José Luis Ábalos and Koldo García. The verdict also convicted Víctor de Aldama. Pardo de Vera, the former president of Adif, is under investigation in the National Court over her alleged involvement in the Koldo case. She argued that the ruling exceeded the court’s remit by suggesting her culpability, even though she was not a defendant in the proceedings.
The verdict, issued on 22 June 2026, concerned pandemic-era mask contracts and arrangements involving people connected to Ábalos. Secondary coverage reported a sentence of 24 years for the former transport minister and 19 years for his former adviser García. Businessman de Aldama received four years. The reported offences included participation in a criminal organisation and bribery. They also included embezzlement and influence peddling.
Information from documentation reviewed by EL PAÍS, Pardo de Vera’s legal team argued that the court’s account included statements about her actions that resembled a conviction and infringed her Fundamental Rights. The defense said the verdict described the hiring of Jésica Rodríguez, Ábalos’s former partner, at public-sector companies Ineco and Tragsatec as having been driven directly and decisively from Adif’s presidency, at Ábalos’s initiative and under García’s supervision. Her lawyers maintained that these assertions exceeded the scope of the trial and could prejudice her right to be presumed innocent.
The judgment’s discussion of Rodríguez’s employment formed part of its account of arrangements benefiting people connected to Ábalos. Pardo de Vera’s defense objected to how her role was described, arguing that she was not on trial and that the findings could affect a separate investigation. The case has also involved allegations about rent for a home Rodríguez used through a network linked to de Aldama.
Pardo de Vera testified during the trial of Ábalos, his former adviser and de Aldama, whom prosecutors identified as an intermediary. Her defense argued that the written decision effectively prejudged her involvement based on evidence she had no chance to challenge as a defendant. It warned that such language could influence future proceedings and undermine her ability to defend herself if she is prosecuted over the same facts.
The defense also pointed to the Supreme Court’s earlier decision to separate the proceedings, limiting its jurisdiction to Ábalos, whose parliamentary immunity remained in place until his resignation, and the two other principal defendants. The lawyers argued that this procedural division did not justify findings that could compromise Pardo de Vera’s rights while the parallel criminal investigation continued.
In their submission, Pardo de Vera’s lawyers said references to third parties in a verdict should go no further than necessary to explain the conduct of those on trial. They maintained that the Supreme Court’s ruling made conclusive statements about her conduct based on her messages and testimony, although those matters were not impressive to the convictions of Ábalos and García. In their view, the language risked establishing facts against her and limiting her position in ongoing or future proceedings.
The dispute raises legal questions about what happens when a high-profile criminal case is divided among courts and defendants. A judgment may describe the actions of people who are not parties to the trial to explain the evidence against those who are. At the same time, the presumption of innocence protects people from being treated as guilty without a trial. Pardo de Vera’s challenge focused on where that boundary lies and on the potential consequences of judicial findings in a separate investigation. The Supreme Court’s rejection keeps the debate over judicial commentary and the rights of non-defendants in view as the National Court’s inquiry proceeds.
