The investigation into the catastrophic dana that struck Valencia on October 29, 2024, took a new turn after a meteorologist testified that the Generalitat Valenciana had access to real-time data as the disaster unfolded. The testimony challenges the account that regional authorities could not act promptly because they lacked timely information about the scale of the flooding, which claimed 230 lives.
Testifying before Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra in Catarroja, the meteorologist said staff at the Centro de Coordinación de Emergencias continuously received detailed weather data from the Asociación Valenciana de Meteorología (Avamet). Its network of 900 stations provided rainfall and other weather updates. The expert described the volume of information as overwhelming, noting that operators could spend hours monitoring conditions as they developed.
Five days before the disaster, meteorological models indicated a likelihood of torrential rain on October 29. That forecast prompted calls for a monitoring meeting, held on the eve of the dana. Juan Ramón Cuevas Camps, head of the emergency center’s Risk Analysis and Monitoring Unit, acknowledged the complexity of the situation expected the following day.
On the morning of the disaster, the first convective storm line formed in La Ribera before the national weather agency Aemet issued a red alert. By 12:40, rainfall had reached 160 litres per square metre, exceeding records set during the 1982 Tous dam disaster. The meteorologist compared the 2024 event with the Tous disaster and the 1957 Valencia flood, citing similarities in their meteorological profiles.
Flooding intensified sharply through the afternoon. Between 15:00 and 17:00, some areas recorded 100 litres per square metre in a single hour. The danger concentrated along the Magro River and the Poyo ravine, where flooding devastated towns including Paiporta and Catarroja and caused dozens of deaths in each municipality.
Weather data and information on road conditions appeared in real time on a large screen at the coordination center, alongside emergency-call information. The Generalitat’s 112 hotline logged nearly 20,000 communications on the day of the disaster. The judicial inquiry is also examining when the public warning was drafted and sent, and what it said: testimony by Jorge Suárez, who headed the Generalitat’s Subdirectorate General for Emergencies, placed an initial draft of the Es-Alert at about 19:06 and its transmission at 20:11. Suárez reportedly said the wording was revised after then-regional minister Salomé Pradas raised concerns about the legal basis for telling residents to remain at home. The proposed instruction changed from “stay in your homes” to “suspend journeys.”
The timeline is basic to the inquiry. The Barranco del Poyo reportedly overflowed at about 18:00, before the final mobile-phone alert was sent. Picanya mayor Josep Almenar told the court that local officials were already telling residents not to go down to garages when the alert arrived. The court also received a graph tracing the ravine’s flow from 10:00 to 19:00. A later reported peak reading was about 2,282 cubic metres per second, before the gauge stopped transmitting.
Evidence before the court has also addressed preparations in the days before the flooding. Catarroja mayor Lorena Silvent testified that the municipality received a Generalitat 112 warning by SMS and email on October 25, then established a permanent municipal emergency coordination structure, known as a CECOPAL, four days before the disaster. Her testimony adds context to the inquiry into what warnings reached local authorities and how specific and operationally useful they were.
The meteorologist’s account challenges the so-called “information blackout” theory, basic to the Generalitat and Partido Popular’s defense. They have argued that the Mazón administration could not act sooner because agencies under the central government, including Aemet and the Júcar River Basin Authority (CHJ), failed to provide timely warnings. Former high-ranking officials under investigation, including former Justice and Interior Minister Salomé Pradas and former Emergencies Director Emilio Argüeso, have also supported this defense. The presiding judge has repeatedly questioned the argument in her rulings, as noted by El País.
The inquiry also covers communications between emergency services and meteorological agencies. Jorge Suárez reportedly testified in a separate proceeding before a court in Llíria about the alleged leak and manipulation of a telephone call between Aemet and a 112 operator. He said the instruction to seek the recording came from the Generalitat’s presidency, adding another institutional dimension to the dispute over responsibility.
The controversy over the authorities’ response to the 2024 dana has sparked wider political and legal debate in Valencia. Similar disputes over official testimony and accountability have emerged in other cases, including the legal action considered against Vicent Mompó over his statements on the emergency response, as reported in coverage of the Compromís party's challenge.
Spain has a long history of devastating floods. The 1982 Tous dam failure and the 1957 Valencia flood underscore the region’s vulnerability. The 2024 dana stands out for its human toll and the questions it raises about crisis management and the use of meteorological data. The ongoing judicial inquiry is examining what information officials had, what warnings were issued and whether earlier action could have mitigated the disaster’s impact. Its findings may influence emergency-response protocols across the country.
