Spain’s strategic foothold in North Africa faces growing pressure as Madrid and Rabat handle a complex rivalry amid shifting regional alliances. The longstanding balance over Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands is being tested by new forms of asymmetric power, where traditional military strength is no longer the only decisive factor. Smaller states with the right use can challenge even the most established powers.
The Strait of Hormuz has become a global reference point for this new reality. The ongoing standoff between the United States and Iran over this critical maritime corridor shows how geography and unconventional tactics can offset conventional superiority. The situation has direct echoes in the Western Mediterranean, where Spain and Morocco are locked in a complex rivalry. The contest is shaped less by open conflict than by the ability to endure pressure, manage reputational costs, and exploit moments of political transition. Ceuta, a Spanish enclave of about 84,000 people and roughly 20 square kilometres on Morocco’s northeastern border, is especially exposed. Together with Melilla, it forms the European Union’s only land borders with Africa.
Several factors compound Madrid’s vulnerability. The economic and demographic divide between Spain and its southern neighbors remains stark. Control of the Strait of Gibraltar and the status of Ceuta and Melilla are points of friction, as is the future of the Canary Islands. Meanwhile, the foreign policy approach of the United States under Donald Trump has reinforced Morocco’s position, aligning Rabat with Israel through the Abraham Accords and distancing Washington from its traditional European partners. The shift has left Spain exposed, with little consensus at home on how to respond.
Asymmetric strategies thrive in periods of instability. Morocco has a history of exploiting such moments, as it did during the Green March in the final days of Franco’s regime. Today, similar tactics appear in the use of migration flows and hybrid pressure, often blurring the line between state action and organized networks. The Spanish government has pointed to possible involvement by criminal groups, but these actors are often intertwined with deeper state interests in Morocco. The risk extends beyond direct confrontation: it also lies in the ability to shape events during electoral cycles and periods of political uncertainty. Reuters’ reporting on Ceuta has placed migration pressure within the wider challenges of EU border management and Spain’s relationship with Morocco. It has also documented how arrivals can overwhelm local services, leaving people reliant on charities or sleeping rough.
Recent events in Ceuta show the practical consequences of these dynamics. The city has faced repeated surges in irregular migration, overwhelming local infrastructure and testing Spain’s capacity to respond. In one impressive incident, more than 40,000 people crossed the border in a single day, straining Ceuta’s emergency services. The Spanish government said 12,705 people had returned to Morocco between 10 August and 19 October 2026, classifying 12,142 returns as voluntary and 536 as expulsions. It also reported making 7,477 places available in temporary accommodation. These figures sit alongside a large child-protection burden: 3,331 minors remained in Ceuta’s regional protection system, while 107 had been transferred to mainland Spain through family-reunification procedures and 181 relocated under Article 35 of Spain’s Immigration Act.
The government described its response as combining “security, designated areas, clearance, triage processes and the streamlining of procedures for the return of the majority of the migrants.” The operation cleared major coastal settlements at Trampolín, Benítez, and Guano. Further action targeted Poblados Regulares, the Tarajal esplanade and warehouses, and the area around the Temporary Immigrant Accommodation Centre. The government said the effort involved coordination between the General State Administration and Ceuta’s autonomous authorities, reflecting their divided responsibilities: adult migration management falls primarily to the central government, while the autonomous city has ordinary jurisdiction over unaccompanied minors. In an operational update, Elma Saiz, Spain’s Minister for Inclusion, Social Security and Migration and Government spokesperson, reported 11,375 surveillance and information patrols and 5,237 officers deployed in Ceuta. School attendance was around 90%, 83% of migrants in designated facilities had been vaccinated, and migrants occupied 20 of the city’s 211 hospital beds.
The scale of the remaining need has also been described by people outside the government. A workers’ union estimated that roughly 7,000 to 8,000 migrants were still dispersed across Ceuta, sleeping rough or relying on civil-society facilities. Reuters reported concerns from charities and rights groups, including Amnesty International and Oxfam, about the speed and substance of asylum processing. Eight charities accused Spain of “grave rights violations” in Ceuta. Critics questioned whether applicants were being correctly classified as economic migrants rather than asylum-seekers. Reuters reported that more than 1,000 people still in the city in August came from sub-Saharan countries whose nationals, information from Spanish government statistics, receive asylum in Spain in more than 90% of cases. The EU’s migration pact allows border-zone processing and faster deportation procedures, but does not require applicants to remain where they first arrived. That leaves room for cases to be transferred to other Spanish border zones.
The repercussions have reached beyond Spain’s external border. On 22 October 2026, Italy and Spain agreed to lift controls imposed on each other’s citizens, ending a three-month dispute triggered by the rush of migrants into Ceuta. The episode shows how pressure at a relatively small border crossing can carry administrative and diplomatic consequences within the EU, as well as between Madrid and Rabat. Migration can become a source of political pressure, with impressive humanitarian and policy implications.
Spain’s current challenge is to adapt its foreign policy to this developing field. The lack of a unified national strategy on external affairs leaves the country vulnerable to external manipulation. The future of Spanish territories in North Africa is at issue, alongside stability in the Mediterranean and the broader regional balance of power. As the international order grows more fragmented, Madrid’s ability to anticipate and counter asymmetric threats will shape its security and influence.
Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish autonomous cities on the North African coast, surrounded by Morocco and often at the center of diplomatic tensions. The Canary Islands, off the northwest coast of Africa, also play a basic role in Spain’s maritime and migration policy. The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, including Morocco, and have since influenced regional alliances. The Green March of 1975 was a mass demonstration orchestrated by Morocco to assert claims over Western Sahara, exploiting Spain’s political transition at the time. These historical and geopolitical factors continue to shape the risks and responses facing Spain today.
