Testimony from a senior figure at the Confederación Hidrográfica del Júcar (CHJ) has shed new light on the handling of the severe flooding that struck Valencia on October 29, 2024. In court, the official said former Generalitat Valenciana president Carlos Mazón arrived at the emergency coordination center without a clear grasp of the situation and needed a full briefing on developments that had unfolded over several hours.
Ignacio Valero, head of the CHJ’s hydrological information system, described Mazón’s late arrival at the Cecopi emergency center in Catarroja as disoriented and unfamiliar with the crisis. Testifying before the investigating judge on June 4, Valero said Mazón joined the emergency meeting at 20:28, after spending several hours in central Valencia. He likened Mazón’s entrance to an outsider suddenly entering a complex operation, saying the president needed the basic events and decisions explained from the beginning.
Mazón arrived after the threat along the Barranco del Poyo had escalated rapidly. Its channel reportedly overflowed at about 18:00, and Picanya mayor Josep Almenar told the investigating judge that a local police officer had warned him around 18:00 or 18:30 that it was nearly full and close to overflowing. A reported gauge reading later reached 2,282 cubic metres per second before the instrument stopped working. The danger was already acute before the emergency alert reached mobile phones.
During the meeting, participants briefed Mazón on critical issues, including the Barranco del Poyo overflow and the potential risk of the Forata dam breaking, a scenario that, information from the Generalitat, could have caused thousands of casualties. Valero said the basic emergency alert, Es-Alert, had already reached residents’ phones at 20:11, before Mazón arrived, and that officials had decided to issue it as early as 19:00. EFEverde reported that only three Es-Alert messages were sent during the 2024 rainfall emergency, starting with the 20:11 alert.
Valero said Mazón’s late involvement cost the team time because officials had to repeat information, but did not delay the activation of the most impressive safety measures. The president received briefings from the subdirector general of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, and the head of the Provincial Fire Consortium, José Miguel Basset. After taking charge, Mazón directed the meeting, telling participants, including those joining by videoconference from the CHJ and the Government Delegation in Valencia, when to join and leave. Valero noted that many officials continued working through the night despite Mazón’s order to end the meeting at 1 a.m.
The testimony directly challenges the account previously put forward by the Generalitat and former high-ranking officials. They argued that state agencies such as the CHJ and the State Meteorological Agency failed to issue timely warnings, hindering the regional government’s response. Multiple witness statements and judicial documents have since weakened that claim, suggesting the basic decisions and alerts were already in place before Mazón intervened. RTVE reported that the investigating judge considered the alert’s timing and wording impressive, calling its dispatch late and erroneous and linking it directly to many deaths.
Valero’s account also drew attention to Salomé Pradas, the then-emergency councillor who introduced Mazón at the Cecopi center and is now the basic subject of the ongoing investigation. Pradas reportedly stopped participating in the discussion after Mazón took control. The proceedings continue to examine the sequence of decisions and the flow of information during the crisis. RTVE reported that officials discussed but rejected a proposal to confine as many as 800,000 people, and quoted a message attributed to Mazón’s chief of staff to Pradas: “Salo, no confinement.”
The Confederación Hidrográfica del Júcar manages water resources and flood risks in the region under the Ministry for Ecological Transition. The 2024 dana was one of Valencia’s most severe weather events in recent years, prompting emergency measures and scrutiny of official responses. The case has focused attention on coordination between regional and state authorities during natural disasters, echoing institutional tensions in other high-profile incidents, including those described in coverage of public conflicts in Valle Salvaje.
The disaster has also shaped longer-term flood-prevention planning. The CHJ opened public participation on ten projects aimed at reducing future flood risk, with work focused particularly on the Barranco del Poyo and the Magro River. The Pozalet-Saleta basins are also included. These measures put basin-level planning alongside ongoing scrutiny of emergency communications and coordination among authorities at every level.
Spain’s emergency management system depends on fast coordination among agencies at every level of government. The Es-Alert system, used during the 2024 floods, is designed to send urgent warnings directly to residents’ phones. The ongoing judicial investigation is expected to clarify the responsibilities and decision-making that shaped the disaster response.
